The Spirit of Public Works
- Evan Papp

- 3 days ago
- 6 min read
Rebuilding Infrastructure with the PWA Blueprint

History gives us hope and our past contextualizes the problems of today.
Following my essay on the Works Progress Administration (WPA), we are turning our focus to another New Deal creation called the Public Works Administration (PWA). PWA’s public housing projects saved my grandparents in Cleveland after they lost their house. I made a short documentary about it.
The PWA was one of the core New Deal agencies created under President Franklin D. Roosevelt to combat the Great Depression. Established by the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, the PWA was designed as a massive capital-investment program that fused public credit, engineering discipline and regional planning into a single institution.
Its success offers a practical model for rebuilding the country’s foundation while avoiding the paralysis that accompanies fragmented policymaking.
How the PWA Operated: A National System of Public Credit and Engineering Review
By early 1933, the U.S. economy had collapsed. Construction was down 80 percent. Unemployment exceeded 25 percent. State and municipal governments were insolvent. Banks in 38 states were closed or restricted.
The PWA became the heavy-industrial counterpart to the WPA job relief programs. What distinguished the PWA from other New Deal programs was its financial architecture. The agency did not directly hire workers. Instead, it issued a mix of grants and long-term loans to states, cities, utility districts and other public bodies. Funds came from congressional appropriations and Treasury-backed borrowing, often through cooperation with the Reconstruction Finance Corp.
Local governments submitted proposals that included engineering plans, cost estimates, public-need justification and proof of maintenance capacity. PWA regional offices conducted initial screenings and technical teams in Washington handled final review. Projects were approved only if they were necessary, technically sound and financially feasible. Private firms carried out construction under competitive bidding rules that required union wage standards and detailed monthly audits.
The system ensured that federal money produced durable outcomes. It also restored the construction industry by stimulating orders for steel, cement, machinery, and engineering services. Heavy industry revived not through subsidies but through real demand.
The agency also oversaw multi-state and nationally significant projects. For river systems, power grids, ports and major transportation corridors, the PWA coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, state water authorities and federal power regulators. It used authority from the Federal Power Act and Rivers and Harbors statutes to resolve interstate conflicts and shape long-term regional planning. Many of these projects, including the Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams, became anchors of wartime production and postwar growth.
By the time the PWA concluded its work, it had financed more than 34,000 major projects including bridges, tunnels, water and sewer systems, airports, hospitals, schools and public housing, most of which still serve the country. Its administrative model became a template for federal-state cooperation in infrastructure and energy development.
What Policymakers Should Understand About the PWA
The PWA is not a relic of the past. It represents a successful demonstration of how public credit and engineering planning can rebuild a nation’s productive capacity. Three lessons stand out.
First, large, durable public works require centralized planning authority. State and local governments alone cannot coordinate river basins, power grids or interstate transportation networks. The PWA proved that a federal institution with engineering and financial capacity can align dozens of jurisdictions around shared infrastructure.
Second, public works are not simply a form of stimulus. When properly structured, they function as a national investment program with returns that pay for itself. The PWA’s long-term loans and grants restored the construction sector, repaired broken supply chains and strengthened the machine tool industry. Its projects were not make-work but future-oriented assets that raised the baseline of American productivity.
Third, a credible public works agency must be insulated from short-term political pressure. The PWA’s reputation for clean government was rooted in Ickes’ insistence on auditing, competitive bidding and professional review. Without similar safeguards, any modern equivalent would risk losing legitimacy.
These principles are directly relevant to policymakers facing today’s infrastructure deficits, supply chain vulnerabilities and energy challenges. A 21st-century PWA would not repeat the 1930s but would apply the same logic to new technologies and regional demands.
A Modern PWA for the 21st Century
A renewed national public works program must respond to present conditions. The country faces declining industrial capacity, aging water systems, fragile power grids and a shortage of skilled labor and machine tools. A modern PWA would need to restore public credit as a tool of national development while addressing new strategic domains.
The first priority would be rebuilding the physical backbone of the country. That includes bridges, levees, ports, transmission lines, dams, and reservoirs, many of which date to the mid-20th century or earlier. These assets require a centralized planning body capable of coordinating across states and utilities. Existing agencies, while experienced, remain fragmented by jurisdiction, funding constraints and inconsistent mandates. A new PWA could integrate planning functions, streamline approvals and deploy long-term financing with the same discipline that defined its predecessor.
The second priority would be strengthening industrial capacity. Just as the original PWA revived steel, cement and heavy engineering, a modern version would help rebuild the machine tool sector, expand domestic semiconductor supply chains and support advanced manufacturing facilities. Public works can no longer ignore industrial policy. The country’s productive base is too thin to sustain major infrastructure projects without coordinated investment.
The third priority would be expanding the public housing stock and modernizing public buildings. Schools, hospitals and water systems form the constant capital of the country’s civic life. A modern PWA could partner with states and municipalities to rebuild these assets, using long-term federal loans tied to maintenance and performance standards.
The program would also need to operate within a more complex regulatory environment. Environmental review, interstate grid coordination, tribal consultation and resilience planning all require early integration. The PWA’s historic practice of engineering-first review provides a model for aligning environmental and technical standards rather than pitting them against each other.
Financing would come from a combination of federal appropriations, Treasury lending authority, and partnerships with state infrastructure banks. Like the original PWA, the modern program would rely on private contractors and union labor. Competitive bidding rules and federal audits would ensure accountability, while long-term contracts would give firms the certainty needed to invest in equipment and training.
The greatest challenge is not financial but institutional. The federal government has allowed its engineering and planning capacity to erode. A modern PWA would require rebuilding a permanent, nonpolitical corps of engineers, planners, economists and auditors. Without this capacity, no amount of money can deliver durable infrastructure.
Building the Next Foundation
The original PWA was created in a moment of profound national uncertainty, when the country no longer trusted its institutions or believed it could build for the future. Its legacy endures not because it was perfect but because it proved that a democratic nation could mobilize its resources and imagination to construct assets that outlasted the generation that designed them.
A modern PWA would create public works that are the scaffolding of national strength. They enable commerce, sustain communities and restore faith in a shared future. The United States once built dams, ports, airports, rail corridors, schools and hospitals that shaped an entire century.
What is required is a horizon vision to rally around with the same combination of public credit, engineering competence and national leadership that guided the PWA in the 1930s. The country does not suffer from a lack of ideas or a shortage of needs. It suffers from a deficit of unity and coordination and a belief that large-scale endeavors are no longer possible. The history of the PWA offers a counterexample, showing that when the nation commits itself to rebuilding, it can transform its economic landscape and restore the foundations of prosperity.
The United States is once again at a point where infrastructure, industry and public confidence must be rebuilt at the same time. A new PWA would give the country the institutional tools to do so. The alternative is drift, deferred maintenance and the quiet erosion of national capability. The original PWA left a map. The country needs only to use it.
And believe we can do it again.
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